EMERGENCE AND COLLAPSE
OF SASSHU ZAIBATSU
Yasuo Mishima
Syozo Kawasaki, the founder of Kawasaki Shipyard, died in 1912. Kawasaki Sohonten (limited partnership), the holding company of
Both of
THE COLLAPSE OF
BUSINESS STRATEGY AND ITS SETTLEMENT IN THE MONETARY CRISIS
Takao Shiba
From the second half of Taisho Era to the beginning of
Showa Era, many firms loosely carried out strategies for expansion and for that
reason they collapsed. Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Ltd. was a typical case of them.
The company had acquired huge profit during the First
World War. But its management became worse in the second half of Taisho Era,
because the company excessively carried out strategies for expansion in the
depression. Moreover, in the process, the company excessively depended on its
main bank. This bank was Jugo Bank. Therefore, when Jugo Bank had collapsed in the Monetary Crisis in 1927,
Kawasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd. collapsed too. The process of this collapse of the
company was a typical case of many management collapses in this age. However,
the process of settlement of the company differed from those of other collapsed
firms. Because the company had an important position in the
Japanese national defense program, and Jugo Bank, the
main bank of the company, too had special position in the Japanese financial
circles.
This article traces this process of the collapse and
settlement in Kawasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd.
DIVERSIFICATION AND
SPECIALIZATION IN THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF KONOIKE; 1868-1933
Matao Miyamoto
Kensuke Hiroyama
The House of Konoike is known
as one of the most powerful merchant houses of Tokugawa
This paper is an attempt to shed more light on the modern
history of the Konoike, with special reference to the
following questions. In what branch of economic activity was the accumulated
capital of the Konoike invested, in response to
changing scene of national economy during the Meiji-Showa Eras? What kinds of
business policy were pursued during the period? What kinds of result did the
investment and the policy bring on the Konoike and
the Konoike Bank? How were the traditional House
system and the managerial organization altered to adjust new environment? What
kinds of role did the employed manager, such as Michio
Doi, Hisashi Shimamura and Jiro Harada, play
in the modernization of the Konoike? By examining
these questions, the writers intend to make clear the causes of the Konoike’s failure to be brought up as a first class
zaibatsu.
In conclusion, the business activities of the Konoike since the beginning of Meiji era can be divided
into three phases. The first phase (1868-1896) can be explained as the period
of diversification.
The second (1897-1919) can be characterized as the period
of specialization in banking. During this period, the Konoike
Bank, which was established in 1900 in the form of unlimited partnership and
wad reorganized in the form of corporation in 1919, became the only enterprise
that the Konoike controlled directly. Conservative
behavior under the leadership of Jiro Harada, an
employed manager, was another characteristic feature in this period. In the
third phase (1920-1933), a holding company, the Konoike
Gomei, was established in 1921 and the Konoike Bank was separated from the Konoike
family. The Konoike Gomei
was more eager about diversification and about holding stocks of various
companies in this period than in the preceding period. In this sense, one might
reckon the establishment of the Konoike Gomei as an indicator which shows the formation of the Konoike zaibatsu. This is, however, an outward look. The
timing of the shift from specialization policy to diversification one was too
late and each share of stock held by the Konoike Gomei was generally too small to control the management of
each company. Consequently, the Konoike failed to
grow up as a first class zaibatsu and remained to be a mere wealthy family.
“HANSAI-SHOBUN” AND
MERCHANTS
--ON THE CASE OF THE
OSADAS
Minoru Senda
The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence
of “Hansai-shobun” (藩債処分, the adoption and
rejection of feudal debts) upon the Osadas (長田家, a big merchant in Osaka), and to take a general view of the reasons why many big
merchants in Osaka declined after the Meiji Restoration and why the Finance
Ministry decreed “Kawasegata” (為替方, the semi official organ having charge of
revenue and expenditure of the Government) to place mortgage equal to the Government money on
deposit in the 7th year of Meiji. The author begins this analysis by
considering the influence upon them of “Ginme-haishi”
(銀目廃止, the abolition
of the silver standard in Osaka), for it was the first policy overtaking the
Osaka merchants.
In spite of being many studies about
the merchants who tided over the upheaval of the Meiji Restoration and
afterward became “Zaibatsu” (財閥, the big financial combine), there have been so far few studies about the
merchants who couldn’t do so.
The conclusions of this article are
following.
First. Some causes that made the Osadas decline are ① “Ginme-haishi”, ②“Haihan-chiken”
(廃藩置県, the abolition
of feudal clans and the establishment of prefectures), ③the decree to repay the Government the money of pre-“Hans,” ④ the decree to repay the Government its money on deposit, and⑤ “Hansai-shobun” (㋑ freezing of credits,㋺ rejection of feudal debts, and ㋩ the current price of “Shin-Kyu
Kosai” [新旧公債, new and old national bonds] being
below face value). It is sure that the Osadas
succeeded in tiding over ①, ②, ③, and ㋑ of ⑤, but the Osadas couldn’t obtain the new base of Profit by managing
jointly “Horaisha” (蓬莱社, a kind of bank),
not only because of the way of tiding over them but because of ④ and ㋺, ㋩ of ⑤. As a result the Osadas were compelled to
decline.
Among them the greatest causes are ㋺, ㋩ of ⑤, for the Osadas, who had a great amount of “Hansai”
and nearly the half of whose “Hansai” were rejected,
had overcome the monetary stringency, looking forward to the delivery of all “Hansai”.
From this analysis, the author would
like to take the general view as to the big merchants in Osaka that they were
at first divided into the declining group and enduring group because of ①, but the latter were divided again into such two groups according to the
influence of ④ and ㋺, ㋩ of ⑤ upon them in proportion to the degree of holding
and embezzling the Government money, the degree of borrowed money in “Hansai”, and the degree of the other borrowed money.
Secondly. The policy of the Finance Ministry to do with the Osadas
after ④was remarkably generous notwithstanding the
embezzlement of the Government money. The Finance Ministry gave the Osadas convenience to maintain the family name.
This is not only owing to the sympathy for the old
illustrious family, but also owing to the inevitable circumstance for the
Government to require big merchants such as the Osadas
as “Kawasegata.” The Government was also to blame for
that embezzlement. And the great amount of the loss of the Government money
embezzled by Yamashiroya (山城家), the Mitanis (三谷家), and the Takagis (高木家) as well as the Osadas made the Finance’ Ministry decide the reformation of
the loose connection between the Government finance and “Kawasegata”.
Thus the Finance Ministry decreed to place mortgage equal to the Government
money on deposit in the 7th year of Meiji.
THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE TERADA ZAIBATSU DURING THE MEIJI AND TAISHO PERIODS
Tei-ichiro Fujita
This article describes the rise and fall of what might be
termed a local zaibatsu which was founded by Terada Jinyomo
(1853-1931). During the Tokugawa era, the Terada family manufactured sake just
south of
During the Meiji period, Terada Jinyomo
invested profits from sake manufacture in many new industries, such as
spinning, banking, and railroad construction. In 1894, he established Kishiwada Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd., which was to become the
most successful of his new ventures, especially in the rapidly expanding
Terada Jinyomo was born into a
large family. He had six brothers and a sister, but all but one of these
brothers, Motokichi, were stepbrothers born after Jinyomo’s mother remarried following the death of the first
husband. Significantly, Jinyomo excluded not only his
stepbrothers and their families but also his very talented and full-blooded
brother, Motokichi, from the Terada Holding Company established
in December 1920 after the spinning company had reaped unprecedented profits
during World War One. Jinyomo allowed only members of
his own nuclear family, that is himself, his wife, and
their children, to become stockholders in the newly founded holding company.
His brother, Motokichi, followed his lead by setting
up his own holding company, the Sano Cotton Spinning Company, with his own
nuclear family members as stockholders in the same month and year.
Jinyomo’s decision to separate himself from his more distant relatives and to not
rely on lineage ties proved to be a fatal errors because
although he had bought property in
Perhaps Jinyomo was more
narrow-minded and conservative than he himself believed or understood.
FURUKAWA ZAIBATSU AFTER
WORLD WAR I
Haruhito Takeda
The
In 1917, the Furukawa family established a
family-dominated Konzern, consisting of Furukawa Gomei as the group’s holding company, Furukawa Mining,
Tokyo-Furukawa Bank and Furukawa Shoji in foreign trade. In the first two years
of its operation, the Konzern expanded itself
remarkably relying on bank loans. But in the spring of 1920, Furukawa Shoji
went to bankruptcy, because it lost heavily in bean speculation in
FORMATIVE PROCESS OF
COAL MINING BUSINESS OF THE SUMITOMO FAMILY
Hideki Hatakeyama
The
The object of this paper is to trace the formative
process of business organization in coal mining of the Sumitomo family and
analyze its business results during the period.
It is a well-known fact that the Sumitomo family invested
in other undertakings as well, a large amount of profits derived from operating
the Besshi Copper Mine and thereby diversified its
business into coal mining, banking, rolled copper industry and warehousing
business in the 1890%.
In such a case, the high level of strategic decision-making shown by the Sumitomo family is worthy of consideration, since it extended its business to coal mining with the intention of not only providing for itself a great deal of coal which was consumed in the Besshi Copper Mine, but also obtaining a profitable investment.
In 1893, the Sumitomo family bought the Sh6shi Coal Mine
and, for the first time participated in coal mining. Further, the next year the
Sumitomo family succeeded in purchasing the Tadakuma
Coal Mine which was regarded as very promising in the Chikuho
Coalfield, and then opened a place of business in Wakamatsu (coal trading
center).
Business results at these three places were very
favorable because the years 1894 and 1895 were the boom years due to the
Sino-Japanese War. In a few years after starting its business, the business organization
of coal mining was arranged in order, and at this point the Sumitomo family
acquired a position as one of the leading coalmine owners in the chikuh6
district. But, afterwards coal-mining business of the Sumitomo family couldn’t
show a substantial development because of its failure to get other promising
coal mines from the latter half of 1890’s to the first decade of the 20th
century, in addition to the Tadakuma Coal Mine.
As mentioned above, in this paper we made an attempt to
observe the managerial characteristics of the formative process in coal mining
business of the Sumitomo family.
THE LABOR-POLICY IN THE
Nobuhiro Ishigaki
Daito Bunka Oniversity
The Miners’ Gild (Knappschaft)
in the
In the 1830’s and the 1840’s, however, the miners’
community gradually lost its effectiveness to organize the miners due to the
development of the Ruhr coal-mining industry, an increase in the number of
labors, especially of the daily hired labors, and the growing influence of the
mine owners (Gewerke) over the miners.
THE STRATEGY OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-A CASE STUDY OF THE TEXAS COMPANY
Tomoaki Saitoh
Three major questions faced the American Petroleum
Industry on the eve of the twentieth century. The first involved the vast new
sources of supply of crude oil. After 1900 the
As A.D. Chandler, Jr. pointed out, Standard Oil had
become a fully integrated enterprise by the early 1890’S. In the next two
decades challenges to Standard’s dominance came from the other integrated
enterprises such as the Texas Company, Gulf 0il Corporation organizing after
the turn of the century. They had already become large integrated enterprises
operating in all basic functions of the oil industry before 1911.
The general incorporation laws of the
Despite the threat of strictly enforced state
incorporation and antitrust laws which might have restricted that relationship,
the Texas Company’ in a practical sense, was capable of integrated petroleum
operations from its inception. In 1917, the state legislature passed the
so-called Texas Company Bill, which permitted fully integrated operations.
THE OKURA ZAIBATSU IN
TAISHO AND EARLY SHOWA
Seishi Nakamura
Founded by Okura Kihachiro in
the early Meiji period, the Okura zaibatsu did business with the government and
the military during the period, and accumulated wealth through its foreign
trade activities.
From late Meiji through the Taisho period, it carried out
a vigorous policy of diversification. One area into which it moved was mining,
it ran coal and metal mining operation both at home and overseas. It also
invested in numerous activities in
But with the recession
in the early Showa period and with the chaotic political situation in