MODERNIZATION OF
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN
Kin-ichiro
Toba
It was believed for long years that distribution system
in
This article tries to make clear how distribution system
and marketing technique has been modernized from the Meiji period to present.
In this connection, two aspects which are believed to characterize the
modernization process of distribution system and marketing in
Modernization had occurred in both markets. In
international market, it was sogo-shosha which led
the modernization and, in domestic market, they were such retailors
as Mitsukoshi and Takashimaya and also such manufacturers as Shiseido,
Morinaga, Ajinomoto and Matsushita which started the production of new
products. In both cases, influence of western knowledge and technique was very strong.
However, as a whole, traditional character of the distribution system was
remained.
It was only after the War that retailing revolution and
modern marketing by manufacturers gave big influence on the whole system of
distribution in
THE MANAGERIAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF SHIPPING
Shin Gotoh
In the international maritime history, the International
Mercantile Marine (IMM) Co., established as an American concern in 1902, had an
unique beginning as follows: firstly, J. P. Morgan & Co., a famous
investment banking, played an important role in forming the IMM; secondly,
Morgan & Co. combined several important liner companies engaged in a single
operating route, the North Atlantic; and lastly, the IMM was composed of
shipping firms whose nationalities were different, but mainly American and
British.
So far, many books and articles have treated of the IMM,
usually, from a viewpoint of regarding the IMM as Morgan’s Trust in the shipping
industry. They analyse the financial aspects of the
IMM, with pointing out failure as Trust because of poor financial performance.
They are, however, little explanation of ‘Americanization’ policy that the IMM
disposed of its foreign subsidiaries and became an American shipping enterprise
after the First World War. In order to inquire into the reason for and meaning
of adopting Americanization policy, it should be required to analyse the IMM’S strategy and structure rather than
financial results up to the period of pre-War, and that is my task of the
article.
In conclusion, it is the reason for adopting
Americanization policy that the IMM failed to formulate definite corporate
strategy because of differences in managerial environment between constituent
companies in the
POLICYOWNER SOVEREIGNTY
AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY HISTRICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
Yuichiro Tamura
Mutually organized enterprise have had a long and
successful history in American life insurance business. In theory, mutuals, without capital item in its balance-sheet, are
owned by and operated for the benefit of the policy owners, and their boards of
directors or “trustees” are elected by them, typically exemplified by the
original Charter and By-Laws of the Mutual Life ‘Insurance Company of New York,
the first mutual in the United States. But in practice, officers and directors
of mutuals, although claiming democracy of their
companies, have completely ignored the sovereignty of policy owners, who have
consequently been silentｷmajority for nearly one
and a half century.
The third president of the Mutual Life usurped the
control through proxy contests and established his autocracy, so-called “Winston
regime”. He and his vice-president held so many proxies, compared to “Children of
Israel,” that no one succeeded in defeating his rule. ‘Management control were
dramatically disclosed by the Armstrong Committee of the New York Legislature
in 1905, saying “Notwithstanding their theoretical rights, policyholders have
had little or no voice in the management. Entrenched behind proxies, easily
collected by subservient agents and running for long periods, unless expressly
revoked, the officers of these companies have occupied unassailable positions
and have been able to exercise despotic power”. With all the drastic revision
of the New York Insurance laws, nothing happened in the elections of mutuals except temporary excitement, and management control
continued at no stands for more than thirty years later the Temporary National
Economic Committee disclosed the fact. “Life Insurance executives and directors
constitute a small group that is self-appointing and self-perpetuating”.
Another thirty years-plus have passed since TNEC, and the situation remains the
same. All the while mutual managements have been criticized and refuted in the
courts, legislatures of the stastes and journals, it
has been desparately impossible to find out an
effective means to bring indifferent policy owners to annual elections.
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE MITSUI BANK AND TWO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES, TOKYO ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. AND TOHO
ELECTRIC POWER CO.
Takeo Kikkawa
The purpose of this paper is to compare the relation
between the Mitsui Bank and Tokyo Electric Light Co. with the relation between
the Mitsui Bank and Toho Electric Power Co.
In the 1926’s and the 1930’s the Mitsui Bank had been
positively financing both of the two electric power companies. Nevertheless, the
Mitsui Bank intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. alone. On the other hand Toho
Electric Power Co. was its own master.
This contrast was due to the difference in point of
administrative ability of managers of the two electric power companies. Owing
to loose-spending management by Shohachi Wakao, the president from 1926 to 1930, Tokyo Electric Light
Co. was in financial difficulties. Therefore Tokyo Electric Light Co. could not
pay back debts from the Mitsui Bank sufficiently during the latter half of
1920’S. Shigeaki Ikeda, the head of the managing
directors of the Mitsui Bank interfered in human affairs concerning directors
of Tokyo Electric Light Co. Firstly he dispatched Seinosuke
G6 and Ichiz6 Kobayashi in 1927. Secondly he changed the president from Wakao to G6 in 1930. Under capable management by Go and
Kobayashi Tokyo Electric Light Co. recovered itself in the 1930’s. The Mitsui
Bank had never intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. directly after 1930.
The intervening in Tokyo Electric Light Co. by the Mitsui
Bank was a temporary phenomenon in order to preserve credits. The Mitsui Bank
had never intervened in Toho Electric Power Co. which could pay back debts
sufficiently under excellent management by the president Yasuzaemon
Matsunaga. Therefore the commonly accepted theory is
not adequate, which asserts that electric power capital was put under the
control of Zaibatsu.
FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND THE JAPANESE MARKET
Mariko Tatsuki
In the Meiji period,
The case was different with the field of life insurance,
where foreign companies entered into the Japanese market already cultivated by
Japanese companies. The first Japanese life insurance company was established
in 1871, followed by many others until about 1890. The foreign companies of
those days had agents in
We intended here to find out the foreign companies which
had agents in
THE REFORM OF THE
SUMITOM0’S HOUSE LED BY GENBEE TAKAWARA, 1837-1845
--WITH REFERENCE TO THE
SERIOUS SHOCKS SUFFERED FROM HEIHACHIRO OSHIO’S UPRISING IN 1837--
Toshikazu Nakase
The purpose of this paper is to trace the historical
formation process of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu around 1837 and 1845 with the
objective of discovering how the reform of not only the house precepts, shop
rules and miner’s rules etc. but also the house system were done by Genbee Takawara, the head-clerk
of the Izumiya-Sumitomo and how characteristics the reform of these feudalistic
house system had as compared with the reform of Mitsui and K6noike in the
Tokugawa Period (1600-1868).
The 1830’s brought Tokugawa
In 1837 there was a uprising led by Heihachiro
0shio(1792~1837), a scholar and a leading O-Yomei
philosopher, who had already sold his books to help the hungry poor. The rebels
attacked
His revolt, while quickly put down, shocked greatly the Bakufu, the country and luxury-living merchants who profited
while the poor starved.
Thus, G. Takawara who became
the leader Of the Sumitomo Tempo reform, had repeatedly memorialized Tomohiro
Sumitomo, the family head, on the need for reform in 1837-1844, following the Oshio rebellion. In this paper I will focus on the role of
G. Takawara, the head-clerk of the Sumitomo, the most
representative big business, mine-manufacturer and usury of
AUFSICHTSRAT IN GERMAN
CORPORATIONS DURING THE TURN OF THE CENTURY AN ASPECT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL AND
MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS IN THE FORMATION OF BIG BUSINESS
Takeshi Fukuoh
The
As widely recognized, one of the characteristics of
German company law since 1870 is shown in the provisions of the Aufsichtsrat as a compulsory organ. This legal institution
was established simultaneously with the marked development of big business.
Therefore, interaction between company law and large business organization raises
an important issue of German business history. But we have still few empirical
study of Aufsichtsrat in its historical reality. Moreover, decisive points of the
problem; its meanings and functions in the dynamics of entrepreneurial
activities have been remained a tabula rasa. Only the relation to amalgamation, relations between
banking and industry, or interlockings have been
roughly outlined in some epitomizing works. The real situations of Aufsichtsrat in the course of making integrated,
multi-functioned big business seems to be most rich soil of German business
history that is not yet ploughed.
In this essay a preparatory approach is tried to analyze
concretely the institutional and functional dimensions of Aufsichtsrat
during the turn of the century through cases of three famous companies, namely:
Mannesmann-Rohren, Gelsenkirchener
Bergwerks-AG and Harpener Bergbau-AG.
As a result, it would hot be allowed to induce any solid
and general conclusion from these few cases. But it is fairly sure that a
combination of top figures of Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand (executives) had been appeared as the top
management de facto, which had acted as entrepreneur in decision making of big
business In fact, they also inclined to become the same social status group in
the Kaiserreich. Effective analysis of the process
and character of emergence of so-called managerial capitalism in
BUSINESS STRATEGY AND
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHNEIDER AND CO.: 1913
--HISTORICAL RESEARCH
IN FRENCH BIG BUSINESS—
Daijiro Fujimura
One of the results acquired through investigation of the
Rules of the Schneider and Co., which were instituted in 1913 to establish
principles of its management organization, is a discovery of the fact that, in
France before the First World War, there was another type of business
organization different from what Professor Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. explained
eloquently in his book, “The Visible Hand”. The difference is found in the
function performed by the middle management of the Schneider and Co., which are
divided into five Divisions according to its products, such as coal and steel,
various engines and electric motors, artillery and armour
plates, ships, and bridges. As well as almost all of its products are
order-made; each Division is organized to perform efficiently functions
necessary for order production. According to the Rules of 1913, each Division
is composed of Sales, Technical, Production, Test and Accounting Departments,
and main functions are fulfilled by the first three Departments; respectively
negotiation with clients, design for contract and production management (of job
shop type). The most remarkable thing is that, in there Rules, heavy emphasis
is placed on co-ordination among these functions, not only between negotiation
and design but also negotiation and production management, so as to acquire
orders profitably and quickly. It would appear that this co-ordination is not
the “Administrative Coordination” which replaces the “Invisible Hand”, though
very suitable for the big business of order production type. These Rules also
prescribe centralization of the functions of these Departments in
In this article, I have examined such middle management
organization and the business strategy of the Schneider and Co., which form
clear contrast to what Professor Chandler, Jr. elucidated those of mass
production, so that we can find out another aspect of the French
entrepreneurship and big business.
STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
OF A BRITISH TRADING COMPANY, 1821-1981: THE CASE OF GUTHRIE CORPO RATION
Keiko Saruwatari
This paper analyzes the growth of a British-owned trading
company, Guthrie Corporation, with emphasis on its strategic and structural
responses to changing business environment.
During the 19th century, Guthrie’s major activity was
general trading between
Facing the depression in trading in the late 19th
century, Guthrie’s strategic interest turned to then rising rubber production.
By utilizing its financial and personal ties in trading, Guthrie played an
intermediary role between the British capital market and Malayan agriculture.
While the company acted as a
Changes in world markets for agricultural products and
This strategy of multinationalization and the relative retreat from
Malaysian interests, however, inevitably resulted in consecutive conflicts with