THE EMERGENCE
OF LARGE-SCALE COMPOSITE INSURANCE OFFICES IN THE
Takau Yoneyama
When we study the history of British insurance offices,
especially in terms of comparative business history, it is paramount to consider
‘composite’ offices which handle various types of insurance--life, fire, marine
and accident. There are no such insurance offices in the
Composite offices, in the strict sense of the word, did
not emerge until the turn of the century. During the years of 1904-14, some major
insurance offices expanded their business by handling ‘new-type’ of insurances
personal accident, employers, liability, and so origin addition to traditional
insurance. In other words, it was at this time that the British insurance
offices undertook diversification of business.
The purpose of this article is twofold. One is showing
the process of the emergence of composite offices, and two, more importantly, presenting
a picture of the historical character of British insurance business against the
background of the maturity of the British economy. References used were the
Board of Trade Returns and some insurance journals and yearbooks.
The following are the conclusions of this article.
Firstly, large-scale composite offices did not derive from life offices (e.g.
Equitable, Standard Life), but from fire-life offices (e.g. Royal, North
British and Mercantile) or fire-life-marine offices (e.g. Royal Exchange,
THE LISTS OF THE 200
LARGEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN
Tsunehiko Yui
Mark Fruin
The lists presented here are the data showing the
financial records of the 200 largest enterprises in the development of Japanese
business. These lists rank large industrial enterprises in the order of the
size of the firm and also provide information on the amount of assets, paid-up
capital and revenue of each of the enterprises.
As the main purpose of this survey is a comparative study
among industrialized countries, the lists are devised to the extent possible to
be adaptable to international standards. (1) The enterprises listed are the 200
largest industrial enterprises, in accordance with the list of the
COMPANY
AUTONOMY AND N.Y.K.-O.S.K. COOPERATION IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS
William D.
Wray
This paper deals with the plans for a
merger between the N.Y.K. and the O.S.K. and the effects that tile failure of
the negotiations had on N.Y.K. management.
Kagami Kenkichi,
the leading financial executive within the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, tried to implement
cooperation and merger with the O.S.K. during the early years of his tenure as
N.Y.K. president. The principal focus of this paper is Kagami’s
attempt to negotiate this merger and the opposition that arose against it from “mainstream”
N.Y.K. executives, that is, managers who had spent theft whole careers with the
company. These managers were more concerned with obtaining government subsidies
and preserving the identity of their firm than with negotiations for the
merger. Their successful opposition strengthened the forces of company
autonomy.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE
DISSOLUTION OF YAMAGUCHI ZAIBATSU
Yasuo Mishima
The origin of Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was opened by Kichirobei Yamaguchi (first as a draper at
Yamaguchi family established Yamaguchi Limited
Partnership (\10,000, 000) as holding company in 1920 and formed Yamaguchi
Zaibatsu. It had developed as a middle-scale financial Zaibatsu untill the end of Second World War. The reasons of
development were:
1. delegations of management
power to able managers,
2. good selections of
investments to stable financial and insurance companies,
3. effective utilizing of
capitals by reducing the percentage of investment to 10-50% in all capitals of
these companies.
After the Second World War, Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was not
designated to Zaibatsu holding company by the Supreme Commander of Allied
Forces, but it was going way of dissolution by the huge property tax, and the
decreasing of values of holding stocks. Yamaguchi Limited Partnership closed
its 30 years history in 1950.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
TWO BIG FIRMS IN JAPANESE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY DURING THE DEPRESSION AFTER
WORLD WAR I.
--Mitsubishi
Shipbuilding Company and Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Ltd. in the Second Half of the Taisho
Era
Takao Shiba
After World War I, Japanese shipbuilding industry was visited
by severe depression. At that time, most of shipbuilding firms in
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT IN
O.S.K. AND ITS LEADING EXECUTIVES, 1898-1945
Masaaki Kobayashi
O.S.K. (Osaka Shosen Kaisha), a
small shipping company covering only the Inland Sea of Japan, was established
in 1884. And it has been one of the two large shipping companies (O.S.K. and
N.Y.K.) having the regular ocean routes since 1909. As compared with N.Y.K.
(Nihon Yusen Kaisha), O. S. K. has achieved a great expansion under the good
labor management and active strategies of leading executives.
This article tries to clarify why O.S.K. could catch up
with N.Y.K. From the viewpoint of the labor management, there are four reasons:
First, after Tokugoro Nakahashi
took office as the fourth president of the company in 1898, he employed many
talented college graduates as staff members. Second, the employees were well
treated even in extreme depression. Third, this company had a more adequate
system of Yobiin (the seamen reserved for sailing the
regular ocean routes) than N.Y. K. did. Fourth, since captains and engineers of
superior ability were promoted to executives, the labor and the management
cooperated well with each other.
This article emphasizes the last two of them: one is Yobiin system, the other is the good labor-management
relations in O.S.K.
A MANAGERIAL
CHARACTERISTIC OF TRAMP SHIPPING IN
--THE CASE OF LINER
SERVICES CONDUCTED BY MITSUI TRADING CO’S SHIPPING DIV.—
Shin Goto
In the Inter-War Period, while “tramp shipping” was
declining world-wide, Japanese tramp shipping developed remarkably well. This
development was due to diversification in operating services, that was the
development of “tramp linerization”.
This is an analysis paper of the start of liner services
and its development by tramp shipping enterprises examining under what
managerial environmental and cooperate strategies, this progress was made and
maintained through a case study of “MBK’s Senpakubu” (Mitsui Trading Co’s
Shipping Div.) as a representative of the general merchant operator. The
conclusions of this analysis are as follows:
First the liner services by Senpakubu
made a good start under circumstances in which there was suitable world-wide
information and a trading network provided by the Bussan Co. But secondly, being
an auxiliary unit of MBK’s business, Senpakubu was requested to act on the whole organization’s
agreement in decision making, which sometimes reduced the strategic time
horizon of Senpakubu’s business. Thirdly, however, Senpakubu’s strategy changed into soliciting a various or a
wide range of different cargoes, loading more “Shagaini”
(other shipper’s cargoes) than “Shanaini” (its own cargoes)
by steadily building a superior fleet, with which Senpakubu
succeeded in new developments from an auxiliary unit into an autonomous
functional operating unit within MBK’s trades.
THE FORMATION OF
OLIGOPOLISTIC STRUTCURES OF THE COTTON SPINNING INDUSTRY IN
Tetsuya Kuwahara
The Naigaiwata Co. began the
construction of a cotton spinning mill in
In 1908 the Chinese cotton yarn market tempoalily shrank under the depression and the devaluation
of silver currency. Then Naigaiwata had to shift the
main outlets from
Facing this crisis Naigaiwata
reconfirmed that it could not grow based on a domestic market alone. It was
only overseas markets that Naigaiwata was given
opportunities to penetrateintre.
But the export strategy was not effective enough to
establish a reliable status there. Naigaiwata then
planned local production in