THE MANAGEMENT AND
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION OF THE YASUDAS’ EARLY BUSINESS
Tsunehiko Yui
It is well known that Yasuda Zenjiro,
founder of the Yasuda Zaibatsu, obtained a large amount of money from the Yasuda
Shoten (Yasuda & Co.) during the early Meiji
period, and this served as a first step in the formation of the fourth largest
zaibatsu business combine. Nevertheless, the business activities of the early Yasudas’ enterprise as well as the process of capital
accumulation have not been studied by any economic or business historians. Such
a common assertion as “Yasuda built up a great fortune by speculation in Dajokan bills” does not seem to be verifiable.
Based on the analysis of original records of the Yasuda Shoten, including accounting books, the main parts of this
paper will clarify the nature of a wide variety of the business activities of
Yasuda, such as real estate, retail selling of dry goods and banking, and examine
the process of capital accumulation in the Yasuda businesses in detail.
THE JAPANESE IRON AND
STEEL INDUSTRY, 1929-33, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NIPPON STEEL CO.
Tetsuji Okazaki
In 1934 Nippon Steel Co., the biggest iron and steel
business at that time, was organized through the fusion of a state-owned
enterprise (Yawata Iron Works) and six private
enterprises. We shall study the background and the process of the fusion to
make clear its implication for the development of the Japanese iron and steel
industry.
Our conclusions are as follows. Firstly, integrated production
of iron and steel was not more profitable than disconnected operation owing to
the low price of steel scrap or pig iron and the high price of coal before
1932. However, after 1932 a fall in the exchange value of the yen changed this
relation of raw material prices, which made integrated production more
profitable than Separate production.
Secondly, the fusion plan made in 1930-31 lacked rational
ground, for the planned new enterprise, which was directed to expand integrated
operations, would not contribute to reducing average costs in the iron and
steel industry because of economic conditions before 1932, and would produce no
commercial profit during the Showa Depression.
Thirdly, on the other hand, the fusion plan made in
1932-33 had rational ground. The planned new enterprise would not only show a
commercial profit but also was necessary to check the rise of average costs.
For although integrated production would become more profitable as aforesaid,
both Yawata Iron Works and the enterprises affiliated
with the Zaibatsu had financial difficulty in expanding it. The direct function
of the fusion should be understood to solve that difficulty.
THE SUBCONTRACT SYSTEM
AND WORKSHOP ORGANISATION
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
Yoshitaka Suzuki
To mention subcontract has been an answer to the question
how the factories were operated in nineteenth century
Whether the subcontract system was prevalent or not can
be measured by investigating the forms of wages paid to the foremen or skilled
workers who were in charge of a group of workers. Some were paid by piece, but
they were mostly paid by time. In the latter case, these workers were not
subcontractors.
More important still was the attitude of skilled workers
to subcontract or ‘piece-masters’, and further to the forms of payment, which differed
from industry to industry. These indicate that the subcontract did not carry
out the same managerial function throughout all the industries. Further, in
spite of these seemingly different attitudes to wages and employment, they have
one motive in common, i.e., to maintain the autonomy of skilled workers.
Various facts can be interpretated
more successfully by using a different framework rather than by subcontract.
That is to use the idea of internalisation of
production function and the transaction of labour to
the manufacturing firms. In these respects, autonomy of skilled workers lies in
the intermediate areas between the systematically organised
workshops since the end of the nineteenth century and the sequential spot
contracts of labour before the Industrial Revolution.
AMERICAN FACTORY SYSTEM
AND THE INSIDE CONTRACT SYSTEM
Haruhito Shiomi
In order to evaluate the impact of the inside contract
system in the process on the evolution of factory management, this paper adopts
the technology-organization approach.
The type of organization developed by the early textile
mills remainded satisfactory in the mechanical industries
(textile, meat-packing, flouer-milling)
and the refining and distilling (cotton-seed oil, petroleum, beer, whisky). In
the case of these industries, the adoption of the new continuous-process
machinery and improved plant design had a profound effect on increasing output.
They had much less impact on the modern factory organization.
On the other hand, the metal-making and metal-working
industries were faced with many managerial difficulties toward mass-production.
Gang-work and separated plant lay-out impeded the coordination of flow through
several processes of production. The inside contract system was the first
organizational response to attain the high-volume throughput in these
factories.
NAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT
COMPANY DURING WORLD WAR II
Shoichi Asajima
Established by Chikuhei
Nakajima in 1917, Nakajima Aircraft Company grew into a huge munitions company
during World War II. Together with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the Company was
ranked as one of the two largest aircraft manufacturers in
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the
characteristics of the Nakajima Aircraft Group by digging out materials so far
unknown, the results of which are as follows:
(1) The
capital of the Company was usually small and the stocks were possessed actually
by the Nakajima brothers alone. The Company was, therefore, able to make
decisions promptly, meeting the severe requirements from the military
authorities, which led it to realize a great progress.
(2) Devoting
itself to working only for the army and navy, the Company had been structured
not to make any profit except for that necessary to make dividends of 7% p.a.
(3) Because of its
small capital and small accumulation of profit, the Company was forced to rely
extremely on borrowings, and in the stage of its rapid growth during the War,
it depended solely on The Industrial Bank of
THE FOUNDATIONS
AND THE AMALGAMATION OF MIIKE CHISSO INDUSTRIES INC. AND TOYO KOATSU INDUSTRIES
INC.
Tsuneo Suzuki
The purpose of this paper is examine the circumstances
under which Mitsui Mining Co. had established Miike Chisso Industries and Toyo Koatsu
Industries, in three respects; (1) the relations of the dyestuff industry which
Mitsui Mining Co. had developed, to the synthetic ammonia industry, (2) the
reasons why it had established two companies of the same type, and (3) the
meanings of the merger of Daiichi Chisso Kogyo Co.
Mitsui Mining Co. started to produce in Taisho Era various
dye-stuffs using tar collected from coke ovens. In late 1920’s, as the
production of alizarin and sulphuric dyestuffs had
increased, the demand of the nitric acid, which is necessary for producing
dyestuffs, also increased. So, it caused lack of nitric acid. This condition
was critical to Mitsui Mining Co., because it had decided to start producing Indigo.
Then, it had to make for itself the nitric acid from the synthetic ammonia.
On the other hand, having established Miike
Chisso Industries, Mitsui Mining Co. set up Toyo Koatsu Industries in order to introduce a new method of the
synthetic ammonia, to produce the ammonium-sulphate
which were then insufficient in Japan, and to supply Miike
Senryo Kogyosho (Miike Dyestuff Works), which belonged to Mitsui Mining Co.,
with the ammonia to produce the nitric acid. The true reason why it didn’t
enlarge Miike Chisso
Industries but established Toyo Koatsu Industries was
to intend tax exemption. So, after the expiration of the special privilege,
they were amalgamated.
The most difficult and also important problems to produce
the synthetic ammonia were to select the technology they should adopt and to
obtain related skilled engineers, in those days. Mitsui Mining Co. solved these
problems by merging Daiichi Chisso Kogyo.
THE EXPANSION AND
Tetsuro Watari
Nippon Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Nippon Denryoku) was founded after World War 1 as a subsidiary of Ujigawa Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Ujigawa
Denryoku), with the intention that its main business
would be the supply of wholesale electricity to Ujigawa.
However, Ujigawa decided to go into partnership with,
and to buy electricity from, Great Consolidated Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Daido Denryoku),
which had completed electric power transmission facilities to
As a result of this Nippon Electric was able to break
away from its parent company and become independent. The main reasons for its
growth were the low price of the electricity it supplied and the rapid expansion
of the power supply market in the 1920s caused by the electrification of
industry.
However, in the process of becoming independent Nippon Electric practiced unrealistic-financial management, letting for example its depreciation reserve become insufficient, and consequently in the Showa depression which followed, the company found itself in a serious crisis.