Yasuaki Nagasawa
After 1902, Mitsubishi Goshi
opened branches in Hankou,
In the 1910s, coal exports to
They sold the goods made by Mitsubishi-related companies,
including beer, carbonated water, paper, and glassware, and traded commodities
of unrelated companies, including raw cotton, cotton thread and fabrics,
cement, paulownia oil, sesame, and so on. They
succeeded only in dealing in paulownia oil and sesame
export goods of Chinese origin to
From the above analysis, we can form a hypothesis that the
Sogo-shosha is a mechanism for stabilizing foreign
trade and that a sales department must transform its character to that of a
Sogo-shosha in order to stay in operation when its
main business becomes unstable.
--THE CASES OF TWO
MAJOR COMPANIES--
Jun Sakudo
This article aims to examine two principal aspects of
As for the first point, two cases will be investigated.
Firstly, the Saint-Denis Company had to abandon the fabrication of synthetic
alizarins in the 1880s, mainly because of stiff competition with German
companies. Secondly, the Usines du
Rhone Company discovered a new synthetic process of indigos at the turn of the
century, and succeeded in licencing its patents to Hechst Co. But the adventure of the Usines
du Rhone was doomed to fail, mainly because of the
poor performance of this company’s top management.
The case of the Usines du Rhone will also be useful for clarifying the second
point. In spite of the failure in the field of tar dye industry, this company
had successfully commercialized the synthetic pharmaceutical products such as salicylates, antipyrine and
synthetic anesthic, as well as the synthetic perfume
and the cellulose acetate just before World War I. In talking about the factors
contributed to this development, emphasis will be p1aced on two points; the
renovation of the managerial system by the Societe Generale Bank and this Company's traditional eagerness to
establish and maintain R & D laboratories, which were
commonly held to has been little developed in
STANDARD OIL CO. (NEW
Takashi Itoh
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the
characteristics of business activities of Standard Oil Co. (
The main characteristics were as follows:
(1) The Company was able to make most products with its
new refinery in the U. K. At the first the Company hesitated to build and
operate the refinery because of some problems, especially uncertainty as to use
of foreign exchange for remitting profits to the
(2) The Company strengthened control over the retail
market of gasoline, a main item among petroleum products, chiefly by extending
network of exclusive outlets. But the primary motive to bring the network into
its marketing channel did not directly come from marketing itself, but from
refining. The Company needed enough and reliable outlets which helped to make
operation of the refinery high level.
(3) The Company’s local refining depended on its
operations (producing and purchasing crude petroleum) in the
PIONEERING ATTEMPT AT
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BY JAPANESE FIRMS TO
Akira Kudo
Generally, the international transfer of technology
occurs from a country possessing a high level of technology to one of a lower
level. Prior to the Second World War many German technologies were introduced
into
The company, Ost Lurgi, was established in March 1926 as a joint venture of
Mitsubishi Goshi, Metallgesellschaft
and Degussa. The initiator of the establishing Ost Lurgi was Fritz Haber, inventor of the Haber
Bosch process, who visited
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE “KYOCHOKAI” AND BUSINESS LEADERS’ VIEWS AS TO LABOR MANAGEMENT
Masakazu Shimada
There have been few studies concerning the fact that the
Industrial Club of Japan (ICJ) played a prominent role in the process of
establishing the “Kyochokai.” A report by the ICJ
formed the basic foundation of the “Kyochokai.” The
business leaders in the ICJ assumed a vital role in collecting funds and making
up its policies, and were elected as the main members in the “Kyochokai.” It is very important to analyze the role that
the ICJ played in the establishment of the “Kyochokai”
and to examine the business leaders’ views of labor management relations which were
founded upon the ethics of “Kyocho-shugi (the
principle of harmony and conciliation).”
In 1919, the Hara government consulted the ICJ about the
“Shin-ai-Kyokai” plan which the government itself had
drafted. This plan reflected the paternalistic relationship between labor and
management. Business leaders in the ICJ felt that they should deal with the
increasing labor disputes after World War I in a way different from the
paternalistic one. So, they adopted a strategy based on the “kyocho-shugi” including arbitration of labor disputes and
various social policy programs.
However, the social policy programs of the neutral
foundation “The Kyochokai”,
were not governmental programs. Actually they were industry-based voluntary
programs which did facilitate labor management relations.
Seijiro Miyajima is one of the persons who most
heatedly argued the necessity of “Kyocho-shugi”. He
recognized the gap between the classes of labor and management and the opposing
nature of their interests, and he contributed to moving the views of the ICJ
members closer to the spirit of “Kyocho-shugi.”
THE STANDARD-VACUUM OIL
COMPANY IN PREWAR
Takeo Kikkawa
The purpose of this essay is to make clear the activities
of the Japan Branch of Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (SVOC) and its predecessors,
Standard Oil Company of
1. Why did
SOCONY and Vacuum establish the Japan Branch in the early 1890s?
2. Why did SOCONY and
Vacuum succeed in Penetrating into the
3. Why did SOCONY start
producing and refining
4. Why did SOCONY’s sales share in the
5. How did the
establishment of Socony-Vacuum in 1931 influence the
Japan Branch?
6. How did the
establishment of SVOC in 1933 influence the Japan Branch?
7. How did SVOC move
against the
These examinations show one general conclusion: in case
of analyzing activities of foreign companies in
HOW ZAIBATSU CONTROLLED
BANK
--A CASE OF MITSUI--
Makoto Kasuya
It has been commonly accepted that the Zaibatsu holding
companies held control over its subsidiary companies by giving permission to
appoint managers, to make a huge long-term investment, to establish branches,
and so on. But we have few studies about Zaibatsu control over banking
companies. The purpose of this paper is to make clear how Zaibatsu holding
company (Mitsui Gomei) controlled its subsidiary bank
(Mitsui Bank) in the 1910s.
Without agreement of the directors board of Mitsui Bank,
Managing Directors could not (a) make or revise rules or regulations of the
bank, (b) establish branches and appoint managers of branches, (c) change the
tacit cartel treatment on deposit interest rate among main banks, (d) change
maximum amount of loans of each branch, (e) underwrote public and corporate
bonds, (f) closed contracts with foreign banks, while they could change the
preferred interest rate of deposits for special customers and make loans
(except asked politically). The board of the bank needed the permission of
Mitsui Gomei when it (a) made or revised important
rules, (b) established branches and appointed managers of branches, (c)
underwrote bonds.
In 1917, the board meetings were held 57 times, of which
25 meetings could not make decisions because the number of those present didn’t
reach a quorum. The quorum is five of six members of the Board, into which
Mitsui families sent two members. From this fact we can infer that the board
meetings didn’t play an important role in decision-making.
In 1919, Mitsui Bank issued new stock partly by public
subscription, the Board added two members in it. The two were the new
stockowners, and they had not been working for the companies controlled
exclusively by Mitsui Gomei. It was the first time
for the Board to accept the outsiders. After 1919 the Board could make any
decisions without agreement of Mitsui Gomei formally.
At this time the Board made some codes which empowered Managing Directors to
make decisions in particular matters without agreement of the Board, but the
codes consisted mainly of the customs which had prevailed in the Board.