2601-1/1

MAGOSABURO OHARA, ‘PRESIDENT OF KURASHIKI COTTON SPINNING: HIS ENTREPRENEUR ACTIVITIES AND BUSINESS IDEOLOGY

Katsusuke Otsuki

Chugoku Junior College

The name Magosaburo Ohara (1880-1943) conjures up in the mind of many people the image of a great cultural figure of rare farseeing intelligence. This is due to his position as the founder of Ohara Art Museum and many other large cultural facilities. People will also remember Ohara as a philanthropist--a generous benefactor who devoted his life to pursuing more desirable conditions for humanity and an ideal form of society.

These images alone, however, would not do justice to the totality of Ohara the man. For they fail to capture his greatness as a prominent entrepreneur and a theorist of unique labor management policies.

Ohara served his presidency at Kurashiki Cotton Spinning, now known as Kurabo Industries, in the years between 1906 and 1939. At the firm, he committed himself to the expansion of spinning projects. Under the leadership of Ohara, KCS had continuously made remarkable progress through the years, eventually establishing itself as one of Japan’s six big spinning enterprises in 1920. KCS originally commenced its operations in 1888 as a small factory in the rural village of Kurashiki.

Ohara founded eight research institutes in his lifetime. Of these, Ohara Institute of Social Problems and Kurashiki Institute of Labor Science were of particular importance to the founder. For it was at these two institutions that Ohara developed his own theories of labor management policies through studies on the relationships between industry and laboratories.

This paper, from the perspective of business history, will shed fresh light upon Magosaburo Ohara, focusing on his activities as a great entrepreneur. It will also examine many of his unique concepts on labor management policies. These policies, widely practiced at KCS during his presidency, seem to reflect Ohara’s entrepreneurial spirit. The paper will be concluded with the author’s rationales for considering Ohara’s management ideas to be theoretically sound. Chief among those is his business ideology of collaborative workshop, which is neither a form of paternalism nor of collusive harmony between labor and capital.

2602-1/2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS IN THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTIY: A CASE STUDY OF TOYOTA AND ITS SUPPLIERS

Kazuo Wada

Nanzan University

The production of an automobile requires the assembly of over twenty thousand parts. Automobile manufacturers do not make such a large number of parts within their own firms but purehasel to varying extents, some parts from suppliers. Therefore, the purchasing policies and relationships with their suppliers have considerable effects on the quality and cost of their final products. Japanese automobile manufacturers organize suppliers in a hierarchical order: its first-tier suppliers form a Kyoryoku-kai (Cooperative Association of Suppliers). First-tier suppliers in turn organize second-tier supplier groups. The Japanese automobile manufacturers claim to maintain long-term relationships with their suppliers and to cooperate closely. This is often claimed to be the opposite to American automobile manufacturers’ approaches to suppliers: they do not organize suppliers in a hierarchical order; and they often purchase parts on a spot-price basis, without developing long-term relationships and close cooperation with suppliers.

This paper traces how the existing inter-firm relationships were evolved at Toyota, the largest automobile manufacturer in Japan, and also elucidates what “close cooperation” between an automobile manufacturer and its suppliers means for the suppliers. After presenting the historical evidence, this paper comes to the conclusion that: Toyota’s managerial efforts shaped such peculiar inter-firm relations; Toyota developed and refined its own monitoring system over suppliers; confident with its monitoring system, Toyota transferred it to its first-tier suppliers, hoping they in turn could monitor the second-tier supplier group; Toyota and its suppliers cooperated closely, but Toyota always monitors suppliers’ performances closely in terms of cost, delivery, quality and other factors; with such a monitoring system, Toyota facilitates competition among suppliers, who compete vigorously against one another to obtain more orders from Toyota and show their superiority over the others.

2602-2/2

BUSINESS ETHICS IN THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY

Takeshi Yuzawa

Gakushuin University

This paper analyzes business ethics both in the period of the Industrial Revolution and during the decline of the British economy in the late nineteenth century. It begins by discussing the social strata from which businessmen emerged and the kind of opportunities which they made use of in doing their business. There have been lots of arguments on the origin of entrepreneurs and their business performance, but according to recent studies, entrepreneurs tended to come not from the bottom but from the middle of society.

The motives of entrepreneurs in the Industrial Revolution were described in the works of Samuel Smiles. His most popular book was Self-Help, published in 1859. His idea derived from Adam Smith’s concept of laissez-faire. Smiles worked in railway companies as a secretary for more than twenty years, while he wrote various books and articles. It is interesting to compare his ideas as set out in his books with his actual performance, as the companies became larger and their organization more bureaucratic.

The question is why businessmen’s spirits flagged at the end of the nineteenth century. I analyze first the social structure in the late nineteenth century and then the changing patterns of business ideas, recently well summarized by M. J. Wiener. Indeed his viewpoint is widely accepted in Japan as well, but I criticize it with the help of the arguments of P. Payne and W. D. Rubinstein which pay attention to historical factors neglected by Wiener.

This paper examines critically current discussions on the topic of British business ethics, and reconsiders the stereotype of the British businessman which has become a handed-down orthodoxy in the Japanese academic world.

2603-1/1

COMPANY GROUPS, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN: THE CASE OF THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Takeo Kikkawa

Aoyama Gakuin University

The purpose of this essay is to make clear the roles of company groups, trade associations, and the government for the competitive power or growth of Japanese companies. It takes up the case of the petrochemical industry, which presents the most suitable data on the point at issue.

The first half of this paper examines the historical outline of Japan’s petrochemical industry, which has gone through the following three periods:

1. The period of the beginning of home production (1957-1964);

2. The period of the large-sized investment in plant and equipment

(19651973);

3. The period of the reorganization of the industry after the first and second oil Shock (1974-).

The latter half investigates the functions of company groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo), trade association (Sekiyu Kagaku Kogyo Kyokai, the Petrochemical Industry Association), and the government (the Ministry of International Trade and industry). After due criticism against the commonly accepted theories, I draw two conclusions as follows:

1. Company groups, trade associations, and the government made many-sided contributions to the competitive power or growth of Japanese companies.

2. Nevertheless, the functions of company groups, trade associations, and the government was within the limit of supplementing organizational capability of Japanese companies.

2604-1/2

STUDY OF THE TREND OF THE MANAGEMENT OF A TEXTILE WEAVING FACTORY IN SENBOKU TEXTILE WEAVING INDUSTRY IN INTERWAR PERIOD

Takanori Matsumoto

Seikei University

The aim of this paper is to examine the trend of Senboku (the southern district of Osaka prefecture) textile weaving industry in the interwar period by analyzing the trend of the management of a textile-weaving factory in the district. For the examination, we have investigated the trend of the management of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period. Through this investigation, we can divide the management period of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period into three parts as follows.

1. The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced cotton textile goods (1922-25).

The management of Nayatake in this period depended heavily upon Senboku county. In short Nayatake carried on most of transactions with cotton yarns wholesale stores, textile wholesale stores, and banks in Senboku county.

2. The management period in which products of Nayatake were diversified (1926-30).

Nayatake adopted a product diversification strategy in which Nayatake produced cotton blankets and cotton shawls in addition to cotton sheets in order to get out of depression: Sa the management of Nayatake in this period was very different from the first period. The term-end profit of Nayatake was improved by adopting this strategy. And also as far as yarns and textile wholesale stores and banks were concerned, Nayatake carried on transactions on a much larger scale than the first period by adopting it. To put it concretely, as far as wholesale stores were concerned, Nayatake depended much more upon Osaka city than the first period.

3. The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced woolen textile goods (1931-38).

As the management of Nayatake continued to suffer a decrease in profit for seven semiannual settlement terms, Nayatake needed further diversification of its products. So Nayatake started to produce woolen goods by introducing high-performance wool-looms. Introducing them made Nayatake capital intensive, and a term-end profit was improved quickly. In this period Nayatake tended to sell woolen goods to wholesale stores in Osaka city by check and cotton goods to local wholesale stores on credit. Also Nayatake tended to buy woolen yarns directly from woolen spinning companies and cotton yarns from wholesale stores in both Osaka and Senboku county. As far as attached finished processing was concerned, napping processing depended upon Senboku, and another processing upon Osaka city and an advanced woolen weaving area, Bishu. Moreover Nayatake tended to carry on transactions with banks in Osaka city in addition to local banks in Senboku county.

Through the analysis mentioned above, the conclusion of this paper should be noted as follows.

Senboku county became the most famous woolen textile weaving area in Japan after World War II. However the conversion from cotton textiles to woolen textiles had already occurred during the period from the 1930s to 1930s. Therefore the interwar period was the very turning point for Senboku which would succeed as the most well-known Woolen textile weaving area after the War.

2604-2/2

THE HONGKONG BANK'S EVEN KEEL AS A DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE DEPRECIATION OF SILVER

Masashi Kitabayashi

Sapporo Gakuin University

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the history of eastern banking was dominated by the depreciation of silver in terms of gold. The continuous decline in the value of silver was a problem for all eastern exchange banks.  The Oriental Bank, which was the largest bank in Asia, fell into a business crisis and stopped payment in 1884.

Under these circumstances, the Hongkong Bank extended their business, made remunerative profits and became the largest bank in Asia. How could the Hongkong Bank get over the difficulties produced by the exchange fluctuation, and grow up in such bad times g The Hongkong Bank’s activities in this era were marked by the Even Keel Policy. One purpose of this article attempts to examine what the Even Keel Policy was through contemporary evidence.

Even though the Hongkong Bank adopted the Even Keel Policy, the Bank could not overcome all difficulties. The Bank suffered considerable losses on the exchange business in 1886. The other purpose of this article is to try to investigate why the Bank suffered heavy losses in 1886. The foreign exchange banks had to lay in fund largely at Hankow as preparation for the Chinese tea season. They had remitted a very large amount of their funds to Hankow in Shansi bankers’ drafts since 1875. But this mode of remittance was stopped by the Shanghai financial crisis of 1883. Therefore, the Hongkong Bank had to send their fund in the form of “Sycee” to Hankow. In the spring of 1886, the silver panic happened suddenly, when the Hongkong Bank remitted large “Sycee” to Hankow. As a result, the Hongkong Bank could not avoid suffering heavy losses from the silver panic of 1886.