2801-1/1

APPLICATION OF THE TAYLOR SYSTEM IN FRENCH FIRMS DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

A Case Study of the Pont-A-Mousson Company

Terushi Hara

Waseda University

In this paper, the author describes the adoption of the “Taylor System” by the Pont-A-Mousson Company, a representative French manufacturer of iron tubes and other iron products.

With the help of the Saint-Gobain Pont-A-Mousson Archives (25, rue de la Valee Maillard, 41000 Blois, France), it is possible to trace the efforts of this company to rationalize their production system.

This paper is composed of three sections. The first section analyses the rationalization efforts of the company in the 1910S. Pont-A-Mousson asked the Morinni consulting company of Paris to suggest methods of rationalizing the production system. Morinni submitted a report concerning (a) worker’s attitude and discipline, (b) the card system, (c) work time, labour and materials and (d) methods of bolt production.

The second section examines the missions of company engineers sent to the United States in the 1920s in order to study the American “Taylor System”. Upon their return, these engineers improved the company’s production system, and generated savings in production costs.

The third section deals with the slowdown of the pace of rationalization in the 1930s. In this decade, the Bedeaux consulting company of Paris tried unsuccessfully to sell their system to Pont-A-Mousson.

The Pont-A-Mousson Company was very enthusiastic in adopting the American production system and we may conclude that their efforts produced significant results.

2802-1/2

ON MANAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEE-INVENTION IN SIEMENS & CO. IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY

Tomio Kimoto

Kyushu Sangyo University

Werner Siemens (1816-92) not only built the greatest electric concern in Germany, he also concerned himself deeply with the enactment of the German Patent Law (1877). It is because he himself was an inventor-entrepreneur and recognized the significance of patents. He stated, “the main reason of the rapid growth of our factories is that our products resulted mainly from our own inventions.”

In his company; Siemens and Halske & Co., in 1873 an unprecedented controversy came about. That is, the upper engineer Hefner-Alteneck (1845-1904) who invented an epoch-making dynamo stated that he wanted to retire with the invention and set up his own company.

At the time the whole German patent law had not been developed yet, and Prussian patent law was not complete, so the rights of employees concerning their inventions were not covered, How did Siemens cope with the situation. Siemens was opposed to Hefner’s demand for his resignation because “even employeers’ knowledge and skill is the property of the company, not to speak of employee-inventions.”

However by only an old-fashioned patriarchic authoritarian approach he could not control his employees’ loyality. In exchange for the concession of distributing profits, Siemens was able to prevent Hefner from starting his own business. After this trouble in Siemens & Co. every new employee had to sign the special agreement concerning employee inventions. This is an important case in history of business and technology because it was the earliest case of so-called employee-inventions.

2802-2/2

INTERNATIONAL CARTEL AND DOMESTIC CARTEL IN JAPAN

The Case of the “Six Companies Agreement” on Gasoline of 1932

Takeo Kikkawa

Aoyama Galvin University

The purpose of this paper is to make clear relationship between an international cartel and a domestic cartel in Japan through examining the case of the “Six Companies Agreement” on gasoline of 1932. The member companies of this agreement were the Rising Sun Petroleum, the Socony-Vacuum Corporation, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, the Mitsubishi Oil, and the Mitsui & Company. The Rising Sun belonged to Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell Group, and the Socony-Vacuum was an American company. In those days, the Royal Dutch Shell concluded the international cartel agreement with the Socony-Vacuum. Of the rest four companies, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, and the Mitsui & Company were genuine Japanese companies, and the Mitsubishi Oil was a joint concern of the Mitsubishi in Japan and the Associated Oil in the United States of America.

The commonly accepted theory emphasizes the superiority of the international cartel between the Royal Dutch Shell and the Socony-Vacuum to the domestic cartel, that is the “Six Companies Agreement” of 1932 in Japan. The conclusion of this paper, however, denies the commonly accepted theory. It may safely be said that the control power in the gasoline market of the international cartel was restricted within narrow limits in a “medium advanced country” like Japan.

2803-1/2

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ACTIVITY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN IRELAND

--THE FALL OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY AND THE RISE OF THE LINEN ONE IN THE 1830s—

Akihiro Takei

Osaka Gakuin University

Was Ireland industrialized or de-industrialized in the first half of the nineteenth century? This is an acute question concerning Irish economic history. Under the Union in 1801 and the dissolution of any protective tariffs in 1824 the major industrial cities of Ireland Dublin, Cork and Belfasts were confronted with direct competition from the British Isles. Dublin, even de-industrialized, remained as the centre of administration and as a consumers’ city, while Cork experienced a serious industrial decline.

Belfast also seemed to decline with other cities. However, Belfast which developed the cotton industry had the alternative to survive in a different Way. According to Geary’s recent work, the Belfast entrepreneurs were competitive with Manchester under the free market in the limited sector. Moreover, as James Kay of Preston invented the wet-spinning process which produced the fine count linen yarn in 1825, fortunately the Belfast cotton spinners had an opportunity to challenge the new business which had more potential in Ireland.

It is true that thanks to the linen industry Belfast survived and industrialized unlike Cork and Dublin. However the story was not so simple. In this essay, we examined who and when ‘and in reality under what background did they launch into the linen business. The result of the examination is as follows; firstly, most of the Belfast entrepreneurs who started the linen business were the cotton spinners. Secondly, many of them changed their business in the mid-1830s, not immediately after 1825. Finally, they were prudent enough to wait and see the degree of the innovation and the situation of the linen market, and were also decisive enough to change to the new business. As a result, their business activity gave birth to the rise of the Irish linen industry in the world market and the industrialization in the north of Ireland.

2803-2/2

BRITISH INDUSTRY AND THE LONDON NEW ISSUE MARKET IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Takashi Iida

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

This Paper deals with the new capital issue boom in the London capital market during the period of 1918-1920 and how large companies in those days committed themselves in the boom. Previously this boom has been characterized as essentially domestic and prominent with large issue by leading companies. However, it should also be pointed out that there were many speculative issues which were not connected with industrial development in the process of the boom.

In order to clarify whether the boom played an important ro1e in domestic capital formation or merely a speculative one, we have analyzed the amount of new capital raised by the issue, and the proportion of capital used for spending on equipment outlays in each issue, utilizing the prospectuses of companies and other documents.

As a result of this investigation, we concluded that the boom had a great significance for the development of British industries, especially large companies belonging to the so-called heavy industrial sector. Though many large companies made considerable use of bonus issues during the period, they also expanded their assets substantially by new Capital issues in the capital market.

However, there were some instances of companies which had to face difficulties connected with the heavy burden of over-capitalization in the 1920’s. These companies had to discover means for effective management of huge assets. For these reasons, the postwar capital issue boom had an important role in the rise of the corporate economy in Britain after the First World War.

2804-1/1

INTERESTS COORDINATION AMONG A MEMBER OF THE GROUP BY SENIOR MANAGERS

--Mitsubishi group in 1950’s--

Gakuya Hirai

Keio University

This research is focused on the formative period from zaibatsu to enterprise grouping (it is not a vertical group but a horizontal group).

After World War 1I, the zaibatsu dissolution was carried out by Occupation policy. In Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Iwasaki, owner family were removed from the firms, and Mitsubishi-honsha, which was a holding company, was broken up. Without owner family and a holding company, operating companies had been forming a new style of business grouping.

The new grouping was consisted of autonomous companies. So it was necessary to have the function of maintaining a body of grouping. But then, it was not long before all of top managers were promoted in their companies. So almost of them did not have enough management skill and experience for interests coordination among a member of the group. Therefore senior managers, who used to be superior to top managers and obliged to retire after World War II executed the function of interests coordination instead of them.

In 1950’s, it was senior managers rather than mutual stock holdings and top managers committee among a member of the group that fulfilled the function to band together in Mitsubishi group. And it depended upon human relationship among top managers and senior managers, which was built in the period of the zaibatsu.