3101-1/1

ESTABLISHMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF RHEIN-MAIN-DONAU AG

--A Case of Public Corporation in Federal State---

Hisashi Watanabe

Kyoto University

Rhein-Main-Donau AG (RMD) was established in Munich in the year 1921 on the ground of the Main-Danube-Treaty between German Reich and Land Bavaria of 1921 and other following treaties. RMD was bound to construct the Main-Danube-Canal, which was finally completed in the year 1992.

The main shareholders of RMD have been German Reich (Federal Re-public of Germany) and Land Bavaria. To perform its huge task, however, RMD has made use of very unique financial system. RMD is authorized to construct and manage hydroelectric power plants on the Main, Danube and their tributaries. As soon as construction of a canal segment has been finished, RMD must transfer it to Reich (Federal Republic), since each navigable domestic waterway belongs to Reich (Federal Republic). RMD has continued the subsequent work for next segment of the canal through the revenue of the sales of electric power. RMD is today regarded as one of the biggest suppliers of hydroelectricity in Bavaria.

In the year 1994, however, the both governments of Federal Republic and Bavaria sold their shares of RMD to the consortium which comprises three major electric power corporations in South Germany, so that RMD was privatized 73 years after its establishment. That is, however, to be interpreted as pseudo-privatization. The leading shareholder of RMD is now Bayyernwerk AG in Munich (77.5%). 97.1% of shares of Bayyernwerk are in the possession of WAG AG in Munich. The main shareholder of WAG is Land Bavaria (25.1%). Therefore RMD stands still under the influence of Land Bavaria, even if now indirectly. So-called privatization is in this case merely manipulation of the Bavarian government to exclude the Federal government from the former duet for the management of RMD. RMD belongs now de facto exclusively to Lain/Bavaria as a Konzern.

3102-1/2

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF A TIMBER MERCHANT IN A CITY: THE CASE OF ZAISOU

Takashi Matsumura

Osaka University

This paper intends to make an analysis of management of a timber merchant in the period of industrialization from 1880s to 1920s in Japan. As the target of a case study, the management of Zaisou, a famous timber merchant in Nagoya is chosen. Zaisou has maintained its predominant position in the lumber industry since Edo era. In Meiji and Taisho period, Zaisou started to develop its business of finance, securities, and real estates in addition to the lumber industry.

In parallel with the industrialization, the demand of timber, sleepers and wooden boxes were greatly expanded. As a result, Zaisou could not afford to continue its traditional business, namely investment in forests in Kiso district. Under such a business climate, two goals for the growth of the enterprise emerged: acquisition of suitable wood for various kinds of demand, and making steady profits.

In order to achieve the former goal, Zaisou diversified the purchasing routes of wood. In the field of wood needed a high quality, for example, such as sleepers, wooden boxes and luxury timber, Zaisou continued to invest in forests as in Edo period. Concerning to the latter target, Zaisou firstly diversified ways of the use of funds, secondly enlarged means of purchasing. It was effective for Zaisou to buy timber in large amount in the shortening turnover of funds and elaboration of inventory management.

3102-2/2

ORIGIN OF ADOPTING THE TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM IN CHINA

Chunli Lee

Visiting Research Fellow of Tokyo University

Affiliated Research Fellow of MIT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the origin of the adoption of the Toyota production system in China. In a large context of worldwide Japanization, the Chinese firms paid more attention to and introduced the Toyota production method earlier than American and European firms. First Automotive Works (FAW), the prototype of the Ford production system in China, began to introduce the philosophy of Toyota system under the direct technological instructions by Taiichi Ohno, one of the earliest proponents of the Just-in-Time method in Toyota in late 1970s. They also built a typical Toyota-style transmission plant which received technological assistance from Hino Motor Co. of Toyota Group in late 1980s. These efforts have been contributing to a great extent the evolution of the production system in FAW.

FAW invited Taiichi Ohno, who was born in China, to conduct seminars and on-the-spot technological instructions in 1977 and 1981. In FAW, Ohno not only harshly criticized the existing mass production system of FAW, but also taught FAW by showing the example of changing the layout of production line. Besides, FAW also sent an observation mission to learn Japanese management methods and visited ten Japanese auto companies for five months in 1978.

The FAW Transmission Plant, which introduced Just-in-Time method, is viewed as one of the best plants in China. This paper examines its system from the angles of production and quality control. It also analyzes the conflict between the old and new system during the adoption process of Toyota method as well as the modification of wage system and organization design. FAW is in the middle of learning the so-called “lean production,” and the transmission plant has become a typical model of this system. Every person above manager level has the book “The Machine that Changed the World” (MIT, IMVP). By 1995 thirteen seminars focused on lean production had been held at the FAW Academy of Communist Party.

Technology transfer between plants is one of the serious problems in FAW. There is a unique coexistence of different production systems including those of former Soviet Union, Japan, US and Germany because of the deferent adoption time. In general, the evolution process of production system of FAW shows an example of worldwide Japanization and a good direction for the reform of state-owned firms which are in the labor pains of building up competitiveness in an increasingly market-oriented economy in China.

3103-1/1

LOI LE POULLEN (1936-1939)

--CONTROVERSIES AND EFFECTS--

Terushi Hara

Waseda University

During the interwar period, French government tried to regulate the production and the sale of several industries to overwhelm the economic crisis occurred in 1930s.

The purpose of this paper will be to analyse the controversies and the effects of the law which was called Loi Le Poullen. This Law of 1936 aimed to regulate the market of French shoe industry which suffered the overproduction. This analysis will include 4 sections.

Section I will be an analysis of the general situation of French shoe industry of 1930S. During this period, French shoe industry had the conflicts with foreign shoemakers, especially with those of Czecho-Slovakia.

The second section will include a look at the discussions about the characteristics of Loi Le Pouilen in the House of Representatives and the Senate. This law was discussed in February of 1936 and adopted almost unanimously, and became effective from the 22nd March of that year. It is decided by this law that not only the opening of factories, but also that of stores should be strictly controlled by the government.

The third section will analyze the arguments of renewal of Loi Le Poullen which arrived an end on March 1939 after two year’s activities. Almost all the interested groups were agreed with its renewal. The author examines the opinions of the professional associations of French shoe industry, National Economic Council and the Ministry of Commerce.

The fourth and the last section will be an examination of the real effects of the Loi Le Poullen. Analysing the documents deposited at National Archives at Paris, the author makes it clear that this law was very effective to controll the production and the sale of French shoe industry. This law succeeded to prevent the sudden fall of the prices of shoes in France. But it must be remembered also that this law was very favour to the technical innovations of the industry.

3104-1/1

SAFETY MOVEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: EARLY PHASES OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1908-1915

Tsuguyoshi Ueno

Hokkaido University of Information Science

The passage of workmen’s compensation laws in 1910 and the succeeding years gave a powerful impetus to the efforts of specialists in the area of industrial safety. In this environment the “Safety First” movement, which was an organized effort in accident prevention led by chief safety inspectors who were more commonly known as “safety men,” extended all over the country. Many safety men were not engineers, so there were some critical views to the movement from engineers who had much training and experience in mechanical engineering and systematic management.

At the beginning of the movement safety men and engineers had totally different viewpoints in approaching industrial safety. Engineers insisted that industrial accidents could be prevented by safety devices and in no other way, and that designing the safety devices was an engineering problem. Whereas safety men preached that only a few percent of accident cases could be reduced by guarding dangerous places, and that the prevention of the vast majority of accidents was possible through educational methods eliminating the carelessness of workmen.

One of the most important features of the educational programs was the safety committee, which was sometimes composed entirely of foreign speaking workmen for “sowing seeds of caution” among them. The effectiveness of the educational methods was gradually accepted by some engineers, especially members of the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers. And the Association supported projects of safety men in the steel industry to found a national organization for disseminating the movement. From these efforts the National Council for Industrial Safety was founded in September 1913 (one year after renamed the National Safety Council).

It is interesting to note that in the course of every-day accident prevention work on the shop floor, safety men realized that any safety work would not gain fruitful results without resolving the problems of industrial relations. In order to organize the communication system between employer and employee they enlarged step by step the functions of the safety committee, at last which became in fact the prototype of the employee representation plan. Arthur H. Young, a prominent safety man, recalled that one of the by-products of the safety movement had been the growth of the industrial relations movement.