3301-1/1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN-HOUSE TRAINING IN POSTWAR JAPAN

--The Case of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd--

Akira Ohara

Osaka University

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of the developmental process of in-house training in Japan. The factors which contributed to the realization of the high economic growth have been discussed from the various viewpoints. We want to consider the significance of an in-house training system which largely supported the formation of diligent employees in this paper, focusing on the case of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., one of the largest enterprises in Japan.

First, in-house training, the training of foreman, in postwar Matsushita were initiated by Kounosuke Matsushita, the president of the company, who was eager to learn management techniques from the US during ‘the rehabilitation period. Then the techniques of Training Within Industry (TWI) and Management Training Program (MTP) were introduced in 1950, and refined to meet the company’s context later On.

The “Personnel Principles” established in 1957. They demonstrated basic concepts and directions of in-house training, and they paralleled rapid growth of the company in size and its production. The department of in-house training, which eagerly promoted enlargement of in-house training into all workshops and all levels in organizations, was-set up in the head office in 1960.

At Atami Conference of 1964 all the management problems of the economic slump and mature markets were severely discussed. However, all activities relating to in-house training were stopped for a time, and “The Principles on Long Term Human Development” were set up 1965 after an intensive discussion. Thereafter based on the principles, the department of in-house training in the head office proceeded with the training of middle management and with the promotion of various kinds of job education, at the same time the head of each workshop had responsibilities to train his workers in his own workplace.

3302-1/3,

U.S. CORPORATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF ROI IN THE 1830’s

Tadahiko Takaura

Rikkyo University

In 1975 Prof. H. Thomas Johnson claimed that materially the concept of return on investment [ROI] was the product of the 20th century. In 1984 I criticised his view by showing the existence of calculations of return on capital stock [ROCs] in the 19th century. In response to my article, Prof. Takatera insisted that Prof. Johnson claimed the non-existence of return on total assets [ROA] calculations, while Prof. Takaura asserted the existence of ROCs calculations. So he-concluded that Prof. Johnson and Prof. Takaura’s positions are not incompatible.

In this paper, I reconsidered this problem. I clarify that in the 1830’s U.S. corporations used the calculations of ROCs as ROA and as return on equity [ROE] judging from the following data: Maximum profit limitation articles of early New England railroad corporation charters and the questions and answers on ROE in the McLane Report (1833). So I conclude again Prof. Johnson was wrong.

3302-2/3

CAPACITY BUILDING IN PRODUCING AIRCRAFT ENGINES DURING THE WARTIME

--According to the Case of J. Fukao and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.--

Hiroko Maeda

Kobe University

During the decade finishing in 1944, a drastic change of production method occurred in aircraft industry in Japan, as in the U.S.

Japan had joined late in the field of modern high-technological industry, then paid a great energy in catching up to develop world-level aircraft engines. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries played a big role for this. After developing some kind of excellent engines, Mitsubishi met a more difficult issue. It was the so-called mass production method (if not used in an accurate terminology), which they had not experienced in the field of such products that consist of so many parts, need long and precise mechanical operation processes.

Under a strong leadership of J. Fukao, who was the key man of the engine department of the company, Mitsubishi strove for building a new method. First, they tried to imitate the system of the U.S. aircraft engine factories, and succeeded only a part. The industrial circumstances of Japan were not matured for a company to realize the same system. Mitsubishi ought to seek another way and their method might show the limits of the industrial abilities of a late-coming country. The most outstanding feature of the method could be expressed as the simultaneous capacity building in the total area of the production processes, including those of casting, forging, making special parts or machine tools as well as mechanical operation and assembly.

The result was awful. However, this cumulative and self-generating experience formed the basis of production engineering of the next generation.

3302-3/3

THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP OF ETHNIC MINORITY IN JAPAN: THE KOREAN FIRST GENERATION IN JAPAN AS COMPARED WITH THE SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS

Meisei Kawa

Kanagawa University

It is said that religious and ethnic minorities tend to have an advantage over majority in making profit. However, there seems to be no established theory to explain the reasons for this tendency. The purpose of this article is to clarify this tendency through an analysis of ethnic personality.

It is difficult for Japanese to recognize the existence of the Korean first generation in Japan who have superiority in the moneymaking activity.

Because it is almost impossible for Japanese to different fate Koreans from Japanese in outward appearance and they use Japanese name when they are in business. For example, Takeo Shigemitsu the founder of Lotte Co., Ltd. and Hisakichi Yamaguchi the founder of Daiwa-seikan Co., Ltd., ets.

There was the ethnical discrimination in employment against Koreans.  There was no choice except lowly tasks, they had to set up business on their own. This circumstance focused not only their but also the next generations’ capabilities on a certain industry.

The Korean first generation in Japan have ethnocentric idea and take a special pride in their noble ancestors. Their value is based on traditional Korean Confucianism that they have been taught. This teaching worked effectively as a warrantable excuse and motivation when they started business. They had a will to invest in, their mother country in order that they may return or send something home with fortune and honor. This became the entrepreneurship of the Korean first generation in Japan.

But the second and the third generation differ from the first generation in personality, because they were assimilated into Japanese. This resulted in decline in their ability as entrepreneurship.

This fact proves that the difference in ethnic personality in one society is one of the most important factors in establishing the entrepreneurship.

3303-1/2

THE PROGRESS OF SPECIALTY COMPONENTS MAKERS AFTER WORLD WAR II IN JAPAN: ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRY FROM 1945 TO 1960

Yuki Nakajima

Osaka University

This paper focuses on Electronic Components makers (of mainly capacitors, resistors, transformers, speakers) from 1945 to 1960. Though most of them were small and medium firms, they established a high volume of production with many new components that large-scale firms were unable to make. They also achieved a high growth in their scale of operations from less than to workers to more than 300, sometimes 1000 workers within only a 15 year time period. These firms will be referred to as Specialty Components Makers. Here I study how they achieved such progress. In doing so, this period will be divided into two eras of reconstruction (1945-52) and Growth (1953-60).

During the Reconstruction era, many electronic components makers were founded. The founders didn’t require expensive capital equipment because electronic components were labor intensive. They sold their products through merchants mainly located in Tokyo and Osaka. The merchants established a wide marketing network and components makers could increase their sales through these networks. To increase production without much investment they formed many cooperative associations. Furthermore, they needed to acquire much electronic technology and founders pursued various cooperative investigations by the support of public research institutes.

During the growth era, the radio and television industries began developing quickly. Main customers of component makers switched to radio and television assembling makers. To catch up with increasing demand, components makers had to expand their product line. Much of investment was put into building factories and firm scale expanded. They also needed to produce high quality components. However such a huge investment created a lack of funds for research. So they were still strongly dependent on cooperative investigations. As a result, many components makers became specialized components makers, accumulated high technology within the firm, and achieved high volume production by the end of 1950s.

3303-2/2

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE RAISE OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GDR’S SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY DURING 1945-1955

Satoshi Ishii

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

The aim of this paper is to analyze the cause of the sluggish growth in the labor productivity of the shipbuilding industry of the German Democratic Republic--GDR--during the decade immediately following World War II. Particular attention will be placed on the quality of laborers and its management.

From 1945 to 1955 the shipyards of the GDR in the Baltic seaport of Mecklenburgs employed some 35,000 new laborers. Although some of these individuals had been skilled workers, most of the others had been not. So it was necessary to train these laborers, but the vocational training had many problems. To further complicate matters, a number of the skilled workers there began leaving the industry in search of improved working conditions and better wages. Consequently, the GDR’s shipbuilding industry was crippled the shortage of the skilled workers.

In terms production management, most of the middle management personnel lacked the ability to manage well. Foreman lacked the authority to avoid having their leadership usurped by the organization of labor interest groups-called “Brigade.” In addition to management’s inability to lead, socialist competition was not sufficiently regulated. This caused poor production. Furthermore, there was little rationality in setting up wage rate and norm for piecework wages. These critical factors combined brought about laxity of production.

It is true the post-war condition was a cause of the difficulties of the shipbuilding industry after the war, but the defects in production planning, delayed supplies and the poor quality of materials, and a seller’s market of labor and goods were important and determining cause of the negative ramifications in both labor and management.

3304-1/3.

NEW FACTORY SYSTEM AND REDUCTION OF WORKING HOURS IN GERMANY BEFORE WWI

Ryoichi Koda

Kumamoto Gakuen University

Factory systems changed drastically around the turn of the 19th to 20th century in the Western countries. In the United States many researchers have analyzed the rise of the new factory system, but in Europe on the contrary there are many issues still unsolved. Not a few researchers still believe that the German factory system at that time was far behind that of America. Actually, however, many contemporary scientists and engineers devoted themselves to solving problems related to machinery, industrial psychology, management and so on. In this paper the historical change of the classic factory system to the new one will be examined in the-German machine building industry.

The first section deals with the new factory system from the viewpoints of architecture, machinery and administration focusing on the great rolls of engineers. Through their activities traditional workshop management was substituted by a kind of “scientific management”. The second section describes the reduction tendency of working hours from the middle of the 19th century to WWI and then points out the importance of new time management through introducing the American time-recorder. The third section analyzes the relations between the mass production system and the reduction of working hours by using two survey reports of the German metal workers union in 1911 and 1912. Results of these surveys suggest that there were intimate relations between the two.

Factory science was well developed in Germany at that time, and it is reasonable enough to consider those engineers who led efforts before WWI as forerunners of the German rationalization movement of the 1920s.

3304-2/3

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT IN MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW GRADUATES’ BLANKET RECRUITMENT

Yukio Wakabayashi

Meiji University

This paper dealt with a history about the occurrence and the fixation of the blanket recruitment that was peculiar to big business in Japan.

The employment practices in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha have a long history and it includes most kinds of the recruit methods that had appeared in the big business in modern Japan. This paper intends to make clear main human resources in the early stages of foundation depended not on college graduates but on the staffs who were developed through the apprenticeship. This way to get human resources faced with unexpected problems soon. The business extension to the foreign countries after Chino-Japanese war caused the need of another sorts of human resources. Since then, the training-up of talent in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha was mainly developed through teaching the Chinese word and Chinese business customs study in each China branch. However, within 10 years this system lost its utilities.

With the rapid progress of the high and middle educational organizations, the graduates substituted for it. In the First World War, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha set up the personnel department and could meet the demand for all kinds of talent only by employing these graduates. In this case, we must pay attention to following two points. First, the radical change of demand structure for i.e. remarkable decrease of the demand from the government offices was took place in the labor market of the new graduate persons at this time. Second, the supply structure also experienced the change, for the high educational organizations started making reasonable modifications to get the jobs for their own graduates. In it, the most remarkable modification can be found in the academic year, which was changed into the April to March Form from the September to July Form prevailing in Europe and U.S. at present. By corresponding the academic year to the recruiting schedule of the government office, the private business could easily look forward to getting the talent from new graduate’s labor market. In this way the junction between the business recruit calendar and academic year was accomplished and the blanket recruitment was fixed.

3304-3/3

THE INSTITUTIONS OF “ADVANCES ON DOCUMENTARY BILLS” DURING THE RISE OF SILK-REELING INDUSTRY

Masaki Nakabayashi

University of Tokyo

From the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s the machine silk-reeling industry in Suwa district, Nagano Prefecture, developed quickly and expanded the ex-port of silk to the United States. This period may therefore be called the era of silk-reeling industry rising. The growth of the industry and the’ capital accumulation were accelerated by finance. Silk finance was directly executed by silk wholesale merchants in the Yokohama market. However, they were financed by the city banks, which were financed by the Bank of Japan. Silk finance system was kept by the Bank of Japan and so, the rise of silk-reeling industry was supported by the credit of the Bank of Japan through the Yokohama finance market.

Silk reelers forward packages of silk-to-silk wholesale merchants and are discounted the domestic documentary bills addressed to them by the local banks in Suwa district. The local banks charge silk wholesale merchants for silk through the correspondent city banks in Yokohama. Silk wholesale merchants are not buyer but commission agents, who are commissioned by silk reelers to sell silk to foreign trading companies in the Yokohama treaty port. They, therefore, have to advance on documentary bills before selling silk. It is an outline of the “advances on domestic documentary bills.”

The first-rate wholesale merchants issue promissory notes on the security of silk and the city banks in Yokohama, which have the special relation with them, discount those notes. The city banks endorse them and then the Japan of Bank rediscounts them. In this way the Bank of Japan’s credit was granted to the first-rate wholesale merchants. The Bank of Japan, on the other hand, never discounted notes issued by second-rate wholesale merchants.