3401-1/2
LATE‐NINETEENTH CENTURY
DOCK AND RAILWAY
DEVELOPMENT IN
―The Barry Dock and Railway Company―
Motonobu Kajimoto
Today, Barry is a quiet seaside resort town with a population of about
40,000, located 8 miles southwest of
pered as the world’s largest coal export port ; however, it is difficult to see
any traces of this past prosperity in the vacant Barry dock today. The aim
of this paper is to consider the development of Barry Dock and Railway
Company (BDR) ,
the main source of the prosperity of the town of
before the First World War. As the name properly indicates, one of the
outstanding features of this company was that it integrated a large wet-
dock and a railway leading from the dock up to
world’s largest coal mining region at that time.
The principal impetus of the establishment of BDR was the reaction of
the valley’s coal owners to the monopolistic and inefficient
th Docks and Taff Vale Railway companies. Due to the increasing rapid de-
velopment of the coal industry, the dock and railway companies were un-
able to cope with the demands of the freighters. At the same time, capital
accumulation among the coal owners made it possible to construct large
alternative facilities at Barry.
No sooner was BDR established on
ate impact upon the existing docks and railways. Of all of them, it was the
Penarth Dock that was most seriously affected. The amount of coal ex-
ported from Penarth was halved in 1890. The profitability of the Taff Vale
Railway also declined ; its dividends dropped from 15% in 1888 to 2.25%
in 1891. Notwithstanding these disastrous impacts, coal exports in the re-
gion as a whole increased considerably due to the widening dock capacity
and the reduction of railway freight rates. The performance of all rival
companies improved in the long run.
Although miners’ strikes interrupted coal production intermittently, coal
exports from Barry dock increased significantly, and BDR was able to
maintain high rates of dividends until the end of the First World War. One
potential problem in trade composition was the overdependence on coal ex-
port trade. It is true that the rate of imports also increased simultaneously
with the population increase of the town ; however, it never exceeded 7% of
total trade. But the effect of this dangerous overdependence on coal trade
did not appear until after the end of the First World War.
3401-2/2
THE MAGNETIC RECORDER INDUSTRY IN POSTWAR
―The Tape Recorder / Video Tape Recorder Industry
and the Japanese Broadcasting Market in the 1950s―
Takuya Hayashi
The first purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical factors of the
Japanese magnetic recorder ( tape recorder and video tape recorder [ =
VTR ]) industry , which developed in the 1950s, and identify the character-
istics of the industry. The second purpose is to examine the point at issue,
that “ the development of the tape recorder industry contributed to the VTR
industry. ” I first pay attention to the beginning of the development of
magnetic recorders in
companies ( i.e, Sony, Matsushita, JVC, and Toshiba ) from this time.
The television industry, the most famous in the Japanese electronic indus-
try, has a pattern of growth of catching up with and surpassing Western
countries, but the magnetic recorder industry is different. This industry ex-
panded to meet the demands of Japanese broadcasters who required tape
recorders to record their programs. Sony was the only company that first
took up the challenge to develop tape recorders. There was no objection
from other companies because there was only a small consumer market and
only a professional market for tape recorders in the world in the 1950s. As
for VTRs, Japanese companies were the only ones to develop helical scan ( a
technique later adopted by Beta and VHS ) VTRs in the world. This means
that there were not only products for them to market like tape recorders,
but also to develop. These are the characteristics of the Japanese magnetic
recorder industry that differ from the television industry.
This paper analyzes the point at issue that “ the development of the tape
recorder industry contributed to the VTR industry “ from the viewpoint of
technology, staff, and experience in the development of products. It was
found that the contribution of the tape recorder industry was of little con-
sequence because of the time lag between the common use of the tape re-
corder and VTRs. But in actuality, Japanese companies developed magnetic
recorders at almost the same time. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the
point at issue.
3402-1/3
THE “LONGEVITY” OF FIRMS IN POSTWAR
Takashi Shimizu
This paper explores the “longevity” of firms, particularly of big businesses
in postwar
aspect.
Organizational growth and decline process have been studied in organiza-
tion theory and business history, though the quantitative aspect of this proc-
ess has not been examined. I therefore studied this aspect by investigating
the longevity of firms, based on studies of organizational ecology and related
research. Consideration of longevity presents a new perspective from which
to study the activities and organization of firms.
From an analysis of the average number of years in which firms are rank-
ed by total capital, and an event history analysis of the duration of listing in
the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, I will show that big businesses
in the postwar period have especially long lifetimes, and there is no “liability
of newness” or “liability of aging” about them ; that is, there is no relation be-
tween the duration of listing and the rate of elimination from the first section
of TSE. Therefore, these big businesses can be regarded as stable entities. It
seems reasonable to believe that this stability is related to the Japanese long-
term employment system.
I will also show that their longevity increased gradually in the postwar
period, but not without fluctuation ; it decreased in the first half of the 1960s.
This seems to reflect the magnitude of economic change during this period,
sometimes referred to as the “ transformation period.”
3402-2/3
FORMATION PROCESS
OF THE COMPETITIVE OLIGOPOLISTIC SYSTEM
IN THE JAPANESE STEEL INDUSTRY:
Kazuhumi Kamioka
The major reason for the rapid development of the Japanese steel industry
after World War Ⅱ was the strong competition among six major steel com-
panies. This paper analyzes the formation process of the competitive oligopo-
listic system, referring mainly to the investment activities of Fuji Iron & Steel
Co.,Ltd., in the first half of the 1950s.
Fuji Steel was established in April, 1950, a split off from Nippon Steel.
This company included inherent management problems from before World
War Ⅱ. The first problem was the restoration from war damages, and the
second problem was poor steel and rolling mill production capacities as com-
pared to its iron production capacity. The third problem was its limited vari-
ety of steel products, which was also biased by market conditions. Therefore,
the company aimed to solve these problems through its marketing strategy.
The company seized a lucrative opportunity through special procurements for
the Korean War. The company planned a large-scale reformation and was re-
latively successful around 1955 when the Japanese economy began its dyna-
mic growth.
Fuji Steel’s reformation meant a reduction of the pig-iron supply. The com-
pany’s long-term production plans, after attaining the reformation’s objec-
tives, showed a three-fold increase in what, but only a 160% increase in pig-
iron supply. These plans threatened the three major open-hearth furnace
manufacturers, Kawasaki Steel, Sumitomo Metal Industries, and Kobe Steel.
This was the major reason they began pig-iron production. It was the begin-
ning of the competitive oligopolistic system of the six major manufacturers,
which coincided with the completion of Fuji Steel’s first reformation.
3402-3/3
RESOURCE SUPPLEMENT MECHANISM
OF THE CONVENIENCE STORE BUSINESS IN JAPAN：
SELECTION OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM
Mika Takaoka
Osaka City University
The first purpose of this article is to analyze the business development of
the convenience store business in
argue the reason Japanese convenience store enterprises selected the fran-
chise system.
The conclusions of this article can be summarized as follows:
The basic factor that enabled quick growth of the convenience store
business from the 1970s to the 1990s was the favorable business environ-
ment, particularly the diffusion of a rapid consumption pattern. In order to
win business opportunities, convenience store enterprises (e.g., Seven-Eleven
Japan Co.) selected not a regular chain system but a franchise system, be-
cause of shortage of human and financial resources.
The franchise system of convenience store enterprises was also beneficial
to traditional small-size retailers. It is more profitable for many small
retailers (e.g., liquor stores) to transform themselves into franchisee shops
in convenience store chains. Simply put, the franchise system was adopted be-
cause of the mutual benefits for convenience store enterprises as franchisers
and traditional small-size retailers as franchisees.
Moreover, this article points out the importance of incentive design, which
was built into the franchise system of convenience stores business in
This is why the franchise system expanded after convenience stores enter-
prises solved the problem of shortage of resources.
3403-1/3
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Shoji Uemura
It is from 1900 onward that modern cane sugar manufacturing companies
were founded in
established in
clan introduced modern cane sugar manufacturing technology from
and
transferred various kinds of modern sugar technologies from the West, and to
some extent acquired mechanical engineering technology for beet sugar at
Monbetsu Seitosho (beet sugar manufacturing
company) in
sugar technology transfer was unsuccessful because sugar-cane cultivation
was not very suitable for the Japanese climate. As a consequence of the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95, however,
Since around 1899, the Government General of
formed a project to establish a modern cane sugar manufacturing company.
They spent a mere two or three years to accomplish this project. This paper
investigates the reasons for such a short time span between the project’s in-
ception and its accomplishment.
3403-2/3
ADAPTATION OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND
MARKETING TO LOCAL MARKET: A CASE OF KAO THAILAND
Motoi Ihara
Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science
In consumer chemical industry, the functions near the market, such as dis-
tribution, sales and a part of product development, play a key role in interna-
tional competition. Kao Corporation is said to have excellent production tech-
nology and steady marketing ability, but didn’t finally succeed in internation-
al market. In this paper, we examine the adaptation process of Kao Thailand
in attention with its product development, price policy, distribution system,
investment on advertisement and promotion.
In the 1960-80s, there were many trials and problems in the process of
adaptation. Kao tried to build direct sales system to sell in local area, but be-
cause of the needs of training on sales staff, short of product line, direct sales
system remained insufficient. At the same time, there was difficulty in de-
velopment of compounding technology for the Thai market because of the dif-
ference of social and natural climates with Japan. These problems were main-
ly due to the relation with joint-venture partner, Taisin Group. Kao can’t
make use of the know-how and resources of Taisin, which contributed on the
diffusion of Kao’s shampoo in the Thai market. But in the aspect of produc-
tion technology, Kao localized its production process including production of
raw materials and transferred brand-new chemical plant from Japan.
In the late 80s, with the establishment of research facilities, Kao realized
adaptive price policy and compounding technology in shampoo business. But
the amount of investment on advertisement on shampoo market was few until
quite recently. On the other hand, success of ‘concentrated detergent’ , the
main product of Kao, was limited because compounding technology was based
on Japanese-standard. Throughout these times, decision-making process was
centralized to the Japanese headquarter. Thai specific conditions were not
easily understandable by Japanese top managers.
Kao has succeed in localization of production technology, often the sources
of competitive edge in Japan, but had problems in adaptation of its product
and marketing in Thailand. Adaptation of technology and organization is key
factor in local, at the same time, global competition.
3403-3/3
THE EMERGENCE OF MASS MARKETS AND
THE DYNAMICS OF RETAIL FORMS IN KOREA
Insoo Baek
Waseda University
This article examines the evolution of Korean retail forms since the 1970s and compares them to those in Japan. Particular emphasis is placed on the issues of changing markets, competition among retail forms, and its relation to the operating system.
First, the discussion